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I . INTRODUCTION
The Defense Data Network is a DOD worldwide collection of
computer networks. This integrated telecommunication
resource is used by the Department of Defense and its
constituents to conduct business, research and related
activity on a day-to-day basis and is an invaluable resource
to those who have access to it. The Defense Data Network
(DDN) is continuously expanding, and as more constituents
gain access, the security risk due to exploitation
increases. As a result, a major concern of network
administrators is the problem of maintaining a safe and
secure network. Many attempts to explain the operation and
functions of networks are often too technical in nature and
do little to help network administrators understand the
fundamentals of network security. This understanding is
imperative if the DDN is going to continue to provide the
Department of Defense (DOD) with an effective networking
resource.
A. Scope
The main emphasis of this thesis will concentrate on an
analysis of problems associated with maintaining large
computer networks and the difficulties associated with
security on these networks. Since the DDN is essentially a
collection of smaller subnetworks, an analysis of these
problems will help enable an understanding of the DDN
security problem. Management issues in this paper will
address steps system administrators of the Defense Data
Network (DDN) can take to insure that all users of the
network are authorized for access. This thesis will propose
guidelines that administrators may follow in order to ensure
that a secure operating environment is available for users
of the DDN. Extensive use will be made of the DDN itself in
order to obtain security information concerning the network
and to have prompt access and response to those involved
with network security.
B. Objectives
The objectives of this thesis are the following:
1. What are some of the security problems in large multi-
function, multi-user computer networks such as the DDN
and how are these problems being addressed?
2
.
What is the problem of network access and how can we
insure that only authorized users have access to the DDN?
3. What are the communications security issues involved and
how can we be sure they are properly implemented?
4. How can we detect unauthorized access and what steps can
be taken to prevent it from occurring?
5. What are system administrators responsibilities and what
should they do in order to ensure the network is
secure?
This thesis will help enable a local administrator of a
DDN subnet gain an understanding of the problems associated
with secure networking as a whole and make him or her aware
of the vulnerabilities of networking resources. Current
regulatory documentation will be investigated to help
identify and determine risk assessment, and help identify
the responsibilities of local network administrators.
C. Thesis Organization
The thesis continues with a discussion of networking
security issues in general, with an overview of the DDN in
particular. Chapter II looks at the communication media of
networks as well as the various network topologies used, and
provides a brief overview of network protocols.
Chapter III examines the DDN security problem. The types
of intrusions are classified and the various points of
attack on networks are explained. The types of individuals
who intrude on networks and their motives are also analyzed.
Chapter IV reviews penetration techniques that are used to
gain access to networking resources.
Chapter V examines basic security principles and looks at
authentication and access control in computers. Also the
topic of multilevel security in networks is briefly
discussed. Chapter VI discusses the communications linkages
that interconnect networks and the different types of
security approaches involved. Trusted hosts and trusted
networks are examined as well.
A non-technical analysis of cryptography common in
networking is presented in Chapter VII. This includes a look
at both link and end-to-end encryption techniques used in
networking environments. Chapter VIII looks at techniques
used to detect and prevent unauthorized access to networks
from taking place. Chapter IX, the final chapter offers
conclusions and recommendations that may assist
administrative personnel in maintaining a secure and
reliable network.
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE DEFENSE DATA NETWORK
The Defense Data Network (DDN) is a large military
common-user data communications internetwork operated for
the Department of Defense (DOD) by the Defense Network
Systems Organization (DNSO) of the Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA) 1 . The DDN is a very large and powerful
military network. It can be thought of as an umbrella
network composed of several large segments or subnetworks.
The unclassified portion of the DDN is a subnet known as the
MILNET. The MILNET connects the DDN to an even larger
network that includes military contractors, universities,
and research centers. This entire collection of
interconnected networks is called the "Internet" and its
users number in the thousands. With the rapid expansion of
the DDN over the last few years, the issue of security has
become a topic of growing concern.
A. Network Security
Network security is a complex topic involving not only
conventional computer security issues such as authentication
and access control measures, physical security,
electromagnetic emanation, procedural and personnel security
controls but also communications security2 . The medium used
to interconnect computer communications systems represents
an additional security dimension that significantly
increases the vulnerability of computing resources. The use
of encryption in networks, both end-to-end and link level,
is just one method used to address network communications
security. To maintain the security and integrity of a large
network requires a complex combination of policies and
technologies. The problems of network security are
applicable not only to the DDN and its large infrastructure,
but also apply to any networking environment where there is
a concern regarding unauthorized access. Networking security
issues are not only concerned with hardware and software
issues but with the human element as well. What are the
types of people who use networks and what are the types of
people who abuse it? How penetration of a network is
achieved and what measures can be taken to curtail
unauthorized activities are just some of the issues that
need to be addressed.
There are several trends that emphasize the need to
develop network security measures. The increased use of
networks to provide remote access to computer facilities,
coupled with improved physical security measures at computer
sites, makes attacks on networks more attractive to an
intruder. The growth in the quantity and value of
information made vulnerable by weaknesses in network
security further enhances the attractiveness of networks as
intruder targets 3 . Computer systems connected by networks
are more likely to cooperate in various ways to provide
resource sharing for a user community, and in so doing the
security of information on a given computer or host may
become dependent on the security measures employed by the
network and by indifferent hosts. The development of new
network technologies has made certain types of attacks on
communications systems easier, such as passive wiretapping
attacks. Many models and mechanisms developed in the course
of research in computer system security are directly
applicable to or easily adapted for use in the network
environment. This relationship is not one-sided however,
since the security mechanisms incorporated in a computer
system accessed via a network can be rendered largely
ineffective if the network fails to provide a secure
communication path between each user and the computer
system4 .
B. Networking Communications
The Internet is a method of interconnecting physical
networks and allows the computers they reach to interact. A
chief advantage of the Internet is that it provides
universal interconnection while allowing individual groups
to use whatever network hardware is best suited to their
needs. There are basically two approaches to network
communications: circuit-switched and packet-switched
technologies.
1. Circuit-Switched Networks
Circuit-switched networks operate by forming a
dedicated connection or circuit between two points. The
telephone system is an example of circuit switching
technology. One advantage of a circuit-switched network is
the fact that once a circuit is established network capacity
is not affected by others since the connection is a
dedicated link between the two points. A disadvantage is
cost: circuit costs are fixed independently of traffic
load 5 .
2 . Packet-Switched Networks
Packet-switched networks, the type most commonly used
to connect computers, take an entirely different approach.
In a packet-switched network a terminal or source host
computer passes a message along with its destination address
to the local Packet Switching Node (PSN) computer. The PSN
breaks the message into small uniform pieces called packets
that are multiplexed onto high capacity intermachine
connections. Each packet, which usually contains only a few
hundred bytes of data, carries routing information that
enables computers on the network to know the packets
correct destination. The packets are passed from PSN to PSN
until they reach their destination PSN, where they are
reassembled in their original order and delivered. A packet-
switched network differs from a circuit-switched network in
that no predetermined dedicated path exists for delivery of
the data. Each packet takes the best route that it can find
at the time, and packets in the message do not necessarily
take the same route. Once the packets arrive at the
destination PSN, they are reassembled in the correct
sequences and delivered to the host as a complete message6 .
The chief advantage of packet-switching is that multiple
communications among computers can proceed concurrently;
however, the disadvantage is that as network activity
increases, a given pair of communicating computers using the
network may experience significant increases in response
time, and therefore diminished throughput.
C. Network Topology
A single computer system in a network is referred to as a
node, and its processor is referred to as a host. The
connection between to two hosts is known as a link, and the
pattern of links in a network is called the topology of the
network7 . In one commonly used network topology known as a
bus, all nodes of the network are connected to a single
conductor. The network hosts place messages on the bus and
the addressees monitor the bus, taking off messages
addressed to them8 . An alternate method used is known as
ring topology. In this topology each network host has two
neighbors arranged in a circular pattern. When one host has
a message to send, it passes its message to its adjacent
neighbor which forwards the message on until the destination
host receives the message. The star topology uses a
centralized host controller. All nodes wishing to
communicate do so through the central host9 . The central
host receives all messages, identifies the addressee,
selects the link appropriate for that addressee, and
forwards the message 10 . There are several technologies that
have emerged to handle data communications. The most
prevalent are the Ethernet bus technology and Token Ring
technology.
1. Ethernet
Ethernet is the name given to a popular local area
packet-switched network technology invented at Xerox in the
early 1970' s. It uses broadcast bus technology with a best-
effort delivery system and distributed access control 11 . In a
broadcast bus system all stations share a single
communication channel and all transceivers receive every
transmission. Ethernet access control is distributed
because, unlike some network hardware, there is no central
authority granting access. The Ethernet access scheme is
called "carrier sense multiple access with collision detect"
(CSMA/CD) . Multiple machines can access the Ethernet
simultaneously and each machine determines whether the
10
transmission path is idle by sensing whether a carrier wave
is present. When a host interface unit has a packet to
transmit, it listens to the ether to see if a message is
being transmitted. When no transmission is sensed, the host
interface starts transmitting. If a carrier wave is detected
the machine waits a random unit of time before attempting to
retransmit the packet.
2. Token Ring
Another commonly used technology is the Token Ring
network. It uses a one way ring and uses an access protocol
known as token passing. The primary distinguishing feature
of token-passing systems is that they achieve fair access by
having all machines take turns using the network. At any
time, exactly one machine holds a token which grants that
machine the right to send a packet. After sending its
packet, the machine passes the token to the next machine in
sequence, and so on. Thus, when none of the machines has
anything to send, they continually pass the token around;
when they all have packets to send, they take turns sending
them 12 .
3. Protocols
There is no predominate technology in use in the DDN.
What makes the Internet unique is the ability of the
different types of systems to communicate with each other.
This is accomplished through the use of protocols. Protocols
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are to computer communication and networks what programming
languages are to computation 13 . Complex data communication
systems do not use a single protocol to handle all
transmission tasks. Instead, they require a set of
cooperative protocols, sometimes called a protocol suite.
These different protocols are used to interconnect the
different types of systems in use throughout the internet
and for the most part are indistinguishable to the network
terminal operator who uses the internet.
D. Summary
The DDN is an extremely large network composed of a
variety of computing resources for use by DOD and its
affiliated organizations. The unclassified portion of DDN is
known as the MILNET. These resources are subject to
unauthorized access at many different levels and the issue
of network security within the DDN is a topic of extreme
importance. Many steps can be taken to ensure unauthorized
access to the DDN is curtailed. Authentication and access
control, communications security and encryption are just a
few of the ways in which the integrity of the DDN can be
maintained. Networks use a set of conventions called
protocols that allow the computers they reach to interact. A
variety of topologies have been developed to allow
communications between computer systems. A packet-switching
technology is used that breaks messages into a series of
12
packets to be transferred along a communications path
between different users regardless of the type of
architecture and topology of the individual subnets that
comprise the Internet and the DDN.
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III. DDN SECURITY PROBLEMS
A» General
A computer network is a telecommunications system
primarily designed to allow a number of independent devices
such as host computers, workstations, terminals and
peripherals to communicate with each other. The DDN is
essentially a collection of assorted networks all
interacting to provide a comprehensive resource of
information for the Department of Defense and its associated
organizations 14 . As the network has expanded so have the
risks associated with maintaining a secure and troublefree
network. The points of attack have increased as the network
has expanded because potential intruders have obtained a
greater understanding of the vulnerabilities associated with
the network. Abuse of the network by both authorized and
unauthorized persons is a continuous problem in the DDN.
On November 2, 1988 Robert Tappan Morris drastically
changed the attitude of network users and administrators
concerning networking security. He unleashed his infamous
Internet worm which afflicted over 6,000 MILNET and other
Internet hosts. The program exploited flaws in utility
programs in systems running the UNIX operating system. The
flaws allowed the program to break into those machines and
14
copy itself, thus infecting those systems. The incident
caused a panic because most of the sites effected were ill
prepared for such a massive scale of intrusion 15 . It was
fortunate, in a sense, that the attack was unrestrained
because it showed the vulnerability of computer networking
resources to intrusion.
B. Intrusion Classifications
The DDN security problem can be described as the
accidental or intentional disclosure, destruction, or
modification of information flowing on or accessed through
the DDN. Identifying the security problem or threat is a key
element in determining the risks involved in the DDN. The
problem can be evaluated in several ways. First, there is
the unauthorized access of information by either persons or
programs that amount to unauthorized use of a network or
computer resource without access permission. Such
unauthorized access may open the door to other security
threats including the use of one computer facility to access
other sites on the network 16 . Another problem is the
unauthorized disclosure or modification of information.
Depending on the sensitivity of the information, disclosure
without modification may have more damaging consequences
than if the intrusion goes unnoticed. The modification of
existing data compromises the integrity of the information
in the Internet 17 . Finally there is unauthorized denial of
15
information which is in essence a denial of service to
legitimate users of the network. In fact, an entire network
may be made unusable by a rogue packet, jamming, or by a
disabled network component. (The Morris Worm had all of
these characteristics) 18 .
C. Attack Points
In evaluating security requirements one must take into
consideration the vulnerabilities of individual computers on
the network and the network system as a whole. Consideration
should be given to the attack points at which these systems
are most vulnerable. Potential points of attack are on the
hardware, software, and the communications connections
between different terminals and hosts. Because of the nature
of networking communications, the linkages between different
users within the Internet are one of the primary
vulnerabilities of networking.
1. Hardware Attacks
Hardware attacks include not only intentional acts
such as vandalism and sabotage but natural disasters such as
fires and floods. Usually deliberate hardware attacks can be
easily prevented by simple physical measures such as locks
and secure buildings. In most cases the prevention of




Although software attacks are most often accidental,
such as the unintentional deletion of files or programs, we
usually associate software attacks with some type of
intentional deletion or modification of data (or programs)
that render the software unusable, or which violates the
integrity of the applications in some way. In network
applications these are much more difficult to prevent than
in stand alone computer systems. For this reason, stringent
security considerations are required to inhibit attacks on
software.
3. Interconnections
Of all the attack points, perhaps the most vulnerable
are the links that interconnect the different terminals and
hosts within the Internet. These connections include
terminal-to-network interface connections, terminal-to-
terminal interface connections, and terminal-to-host
connections. These types of connections make the problem of
security in networks much more difficult than the problems
associated with stand alone computer security.
D. Network Abusers
Frequently, the weak link in network and computing
systems is the people who use them. Individuals who intrude
on networks or computer systems in general can be classified
in two ways. Those who seek to gain access to the system
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with the explicit intent of purposely causing damage, or
those who accidentally damage resources is some fashion
either through unintentional or intentional access.
1. Unintentional Intrusion
Unintentional intrusion may appear to be relatively
harmless but the fact is that any unauthorized release,
access, or modification of information can have profound
repercussions in most circumstances. For example, there are
potential legal problems associated with unauthorized
disclosure; additionally, the loss of customer goodwill in
many business organizations due to disclosure can do much to
damage an organizations reputation. The initial damage is
still the same regardless of why or how.
2. Intentional Intrusion
Intentional intrusion is a much more serious matter.
The problem is more serious not because the damage caused is
greater, but because it often involves illegal activity in
some manner. According to the FBI each year intentional
malicious activity accounts for anywhere from 300 to 500
billion dollars a year in costs 19 . Amateur computer users
account for the majority of computer crime committed to date
and their activities are expanding every year. Amateurs can
be classified as non-computer professionals who are usually
tempted by the opportunity to obtain personal profit,
revenge against a person or institution, or the challenge.
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They usually are not technically sophisticated in their
techniques but possess just enough knowledge to cause
substantial damage.
Hackers and Crackers are another category of abusers
that are usually associated with university or high school
students who attempt to access computer facilities for which
they are not authorized. While these may not appear to be
serious offenders they have caused substantial monetary
damages to institutions which they have penetrated. The term
Hackers is usually associated (by the news media) with
innocent intruders who, in many cases may actually enhance
technological innovation through their ability to
continuously penetrate existing systems. Crackers, on the
other hand, are those who penetrate systems with the direct
intent of causing damage. Career Criminals are computer
professionals who engage in computer crime knowing the full
implications of their transgressions. They actively seek out
targets and attack them in order to realize some type of
gain at the expense of those they have attacked. It is often
difficult to apprehend career criminals because their
computer expertise often allows them to manipulate the
system undetected. Even when they are apprehended it is
difficult to prosecute them because there is a lack of
precise legal definitions as to what constitutes computer
crimes. Organizations often choose not to prosecute those
involved in computer crimes because of the difficulty and
19
costs associated with prosecution in addition to the
potential loss of public confidence in the victim
organization.
E. Summary
The threat to the DDN and to the Internet in general can
be viewed as the unauthorized access of information,
unauthorized disclosure or modification of information, and
unauthorized denial of information. As the DDN has expanded
the threat to Internet resources has expanded with it. In
assessing these threats we can evaluate software, hardware,
and the communications medium that interconnect the network
as potential points of attack and we can take steps to
reduce these vulnerabilities. The identification of the
types of individuals who may possibly intrude on the DDN is
important for taking security precautions against potential
violations. Charles Pfleegers' book "Security in Computing"
and the "DDN New Users Guide" by Barbara Varallo are
excellent sources that discuss these topics. In Chapter IX,
I have proposed several recommendations to help network





In evaluating the security relationships between
different hosts on the Internet one must consider the
various penetration techniques that intruders use to access
computer networks. The techniques used for penetration are
closely associated with the computer or networking systems
vulnerabilities. Therefore, successful prevention requires
the identification of these vulnerabilities. Through
analyzing a systems protection mechanisms, how they
function, and their deficiencies, consideration can be given
to how such mechanisms can be circumvented, nullified, or
deceived. A particular type of technique may be used to
exploit more than one vulnerability, and a vulnerability may
be exploited by more than one technique. Some penetration
techniques leave signatures (residual traces) and others do
not. Such signatures, their detection, and analysis, are
fundamental to threat monitoring and security auditing. Many
of these techniques can be categorized by the types of
activity they involve and the system vulnerabilities they
exploit.
21
B. Viruses and Worms
By far the most common type of penetration is the use of
what are called viruses not to be confused with a worm.
Confusion as to whether a rogue program is a worm or a virus
is due to a subtle difference in their behavior. A viral
program, or virus, is a piece of code that attaches itself
to other programs (hosts) , including operating system files;
however, it cannot run independently. It requires that its
host program be executed in order to activate the viral code
segment. A worm is a fully functional, independent program
that can run by itself and propagate a fully working version
of itself to other machines. It is derived from the word
tapeworm, a parasitic organism that lives inside a host and
saps its resources to maintain itself20 . Precautions must be
taken to inhibit both types of these attacks.
C. Finger Programs
One type of penetration technique exploits a system
utility known as the "finger program". This program is a
utility on Unix based computer systems that allows users to
obtain information about other users. It is generally used
to identify the full name or login name of a user,
determines whether or not the user is currently logged in,
and then obtains other information about other users. This
program can be exploited by an intruder to obtain critical
information necessary to access the system.
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Another type of attack is through the exploitation of the
electronic mail utility found on most systems. The Morris
worm took advantage of a little known debugging access
(trapdoor) in the utility that allowed testers to verify
that mail was arriving at a particular site without the need
to activate address resolution routines.
Potential intruders can also take advantage of sloppy
administrative techniques. Many system services have
configuration and command files owned by a common user
identification number. In other words, systems that have
services such as electronic mail, finger utilities, file
transfer protocol (FTP) and others, all use the same user
identification number to utilize these services. The simple
process of assigning different user identification numbers
could help reduce the vulnerabilities of penetration.
D. Passwords
One of the most well-known penetration techniques is to
attempt to discover authorized user passwords. The attacker
accomplishes this by using a list of possible passwords and
comparing them against the actual passwords. The security of
the password is provided in large part by the prohibitive
effort of trying all combinations of letters. Unfortunately,
as machines get faster, the cost of such attempts decreases.
Potential intruders may utilize what is known as "cracker"
programs in order to exploit poor password selections. These
23
programs systematically try all possible password
combinations that are in a file. The file may consist of all
the words in a dictionary or a carefully constructed set of
possible passwords based on some personal knowledge of the
user.
E. Browsing
Browsing allows an individual to gain unauthorized access
to a users files by exploiting vulnerabilities in the file
access control mechanisms in the operating system. Browsing
requires an understanding of the general system specific
naming convention of computer files. Unauthorized system
users can use this technique numerous times to browse
through all the files looking for classified or sensitive
information. This technique is not generally possible when
the files are protected by passwords or other security
precautions.
F. Masquerading
Gaining unauthorized access to a system by assuming the
identity of another authorized user is called masquerading.
The success of this technique stems from a computer system's
inability to establish a user's identity other than through
symbolic identifiers. The easiest method of masquerading is
to obtain the password and other identifiers of an
authorized user from some report or document that was
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carelessly left exposed. This situation is most likely to
occur in installations that support remote terminals where
no option exists to have such identifiers suppressed by the
terminal during the log on procedure. Even when a terminal
does possess suppression capabilities which overtypes these
identifiers before or after their printing, it may still be
possible to obtain the identifiers. A more sophisticated
technique for gaining access to an authorized user's
identifiers is to wiretap the terminal and intercept the
identifiers when they are transmitted in the clear over
communication lines21 . A much less sophisticated, but very
common technique, is to look over someones ' shoulder as they
are entering their password on a terminal or when they are
writing it down to keep from forgetting it. Regardless of
how the intruder gains access to the system the damage can
be the same.
G. Scavenging
This penetration technique exploits the vulnerability of
unerased residual data. Both primary and secondary storage
media used for processing information may continue to retain
information after it has been released for reallocation to
another user or program. The latter may then scavenge the
information by reading the storage media before making any
other use of it22 .
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H. Unknown System State Exploitation
This method takes advantage of certain conditions that
occur after a partial or total system crash. For example,
some user files may remain open without an end-of-file
indication. Another individual or program may then obtain
unauthorized access to other files by reading beyond that
indicator when the system resumes operation.
I. Asynchronous Interrupt
This technique exploits system vulnerabilities arising
from deficiencies in the interrupt management facilities of
an operating system. If a processor suspends execution of a
protection mechanism to process an interrupt and is then
erroneously returned to a user program without completing
the security check then the protection has been
circumvented23 .
J. Spoofing
Spoofing exploits the inability of remote users to verify
that they are actually communicating with the intended
system rather than some masquerading system. This deception,
also known as a "Mockingbird Attack," can be perpetrated by
intercepting the terminals communication lines and providing
system-like responses to the user. A variation of spoofing
is the use of an application program to provide responses
similar to the operating system, so the operator will
26
unknowingly provide the passwords to an application program
and not to the operating system24 .
K. Trojan Horse
In this technique computer processing is covertly altered
by either modifying existing program instructions or
inserting new instructions. Once this has been accomplished,
whenever the altered processes are used the perpetrator will
automatically benefit from unauthorized functions performed
in addition to the routine output. This modification is
usually done by hiding secret instructions in either the
original source-code or the machine-code version of a
lengthy program. Even harder to detect is the alteration of
the operating and utility system programs so that they make
only temporary changes in the target program as it is
executing. The hardware version of the Trojan Horse
technique is relatively rare. However, the replacement of
valid micro-chips with slightly altered counterfeit chips is
entirely possible and would is extremely hard to detect. In
either the software or hardware Trojan Horse method, only
someone with access to a program or the computer system
could become a perpetrator.
L. Clandestine Machine Code Change
This technique is closely related to the Trojan Horse
technique. It allows system programmers to insert code into
27
the system that creates trapdoors. At specific times based
on certain combinations, these trapdoors can be activated by
an intruder through the user's program. Individuals who
initially design the system, contract maintenance personnel
who fix the system, or people who are able to gain access to
the supervisory state also have this opportunity. The
technique could be as simple as users stealing job card
information on work that has already gone through the
system. They then resubmit this information to the system on
their own job cards along with another program25 .
M. Summary
Understanding the way an unauthorized intruder attempts
to gain access to a network system is important in
preventing unauthorized and potentially harmful
exploitation. The types of techniques used are closely
related to the type of networking system employed. By
analyzing these techniques and exploiting their
vulnerabilities the integrity of a networking communications




Network security can be defined as the protection of
network resources against unauthorized disclosure,
modification, utilization, restriction, or destruction. When
evaluating security in the DDN we can consider three
fundamentally important areas:
1. The physical security of the computer systems and the
network as a whole.
2. Access to the resources of the network.
3
.
Communications security of the medium of information
transfer.
B. Physical Security
Certainly one of the most fundamental aspects of
security, and one of the most easily understood, is physical
security. Physical security includes the facilities that
house the computers, hosts, and other peripheral devices as
well as the remote terminals that comprise the network.
Another way to describe it is the external protection
provided for the computer system. This physical protection
also includes controlling the dangers due to natural
disasters such as fire, floods, storms and other unscheduled
contingencies. Protection against physical entry by
prospective intruders must be maintained in order to ensure
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a secure system and as a result, physical security
considerations are often one of the most easily addressed of
all security precautions.
C. Authentication and Access Controls
The most challenging security consideration in networks
is the problem of authentication and access control.
Although authentication and access control mechanisms are
logically and functionally separate, they are related in
that the decisions made by access control mechanisms are
based on information supplied by authentication mechanisms.
Both types of mechanisms are, in turn, dependent on
communications security measures since violations of
communications security can result in circumvention of the
security policies implemented by the authentication and
access control mechanisms. Authentication and access control
mechanisms have been studied extensively in the context of
individual computer systems, and many of the techniques and
much of the terminology developed in that context are
applicable in a network environment as well. However, the
desire to provide flexible and controlled sharing of
resources in networks introduces the need for additional
authentication and access control techniques26 . In a security
context, the term authentication applies to procedures for
verifying the claimed identity of a user, whether this user
is embodied as an individual, a terminal, or a network. A
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variety of techniques have been developed for personal
identification including various password schemes, the use
of badges and keys, and physical characteristic measurements
such as fingerprints, voice prints, and retinal scans.
1. Passwords
The most common type of authentication mechanism is
the use of passwords. One of the easiest ways an intruder
can get into a system is by breaking into someone's account.
This is usually easy to do, since many systems have old
accounts whose users have left the organization or accounts
with easy to guess passwords. If an intruder can discover a
user's password he or she can log in to the system and
operate with all the capabilities of that user. If the
password obtained is that of a system administrator then the
intruder will have read and write access to most every file
on the system, or to put it another way, he will have
administrative capabilities on that network. For this
reason, choosing secure passwords is very important.
One of the most significant problems with password
authentication systems is that users often choose very poor
passwords. Experiments have been conducted to determine
typical user's habits in the choice of passwords. In a
collection of 3,289 passwords, 16% of them contained three
characters or less, and an astonishing 86% were those which
could generally be described as insecure27 . Additional
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experiments show that by trying three simple guesses on each
account, the login name, the login name in reverse, and the
two concatenated together, an intruder can expect to obtain
access to between 8 and 3 percent of the accounts on a
typical system28 . Another experiment showed that by trying
the 20 most common female first names, followed by a single
digit, at least one password was valid on each of several
dozen machines surveyed. Further experimentation has found
that by trying variations on the login name, user's first
and last names, and a list of nearly 1800 common first
names, up to 50 percent of the passwords on any given system
can be cracked in a matter of two or three days29 .
The object when choosing a password is to make it as
difficult as possible for an intruder to make educated
guesses about the chosen password. This leaves him no
alternative but a brute force search, trying every possible
combination of letters, numbers, and punctuation. A search
of this sort, even conducted on a machine that could try one
million passwords per second, would require on average, over
a hundred years to complete for an eight bit length
password. The importance of obeying good password selection
rules cannot be overemphasized. The Internet worm, as part
of its strategy for breaking into new machines, attempted to
crack user passwords. First, the worm tried simple choices
such as the login name, user's first and last names, and so
32
on. Next, the worm tried each word present in an internal
dictionary of 432 words. When all else failed, the worm
tried going through the system dictionary, trying each word.
The password selection criteria discussed above successfully
guard against all three of these strategies30 . Appendix A
provides guidelines to follow when selecting passwords.
2 . Token-Smart Cards
A means of authentication that is becoming quite
popular is the use of token or smart cards. Anyone that has
used an automated teller machine is familiar with the token
card. Credit type cards with magnetic strips contain
information that permit access to the system. Simple reading
mechanisms can be built into the computer systems without
great expense. The problem with the use of this type of
mechanism is the cards can easily be lost or stolen. Theft
may even be unnecessary, since credit cards may be readily
duplicated, including the magnetic strip with its coded
information. A modification of the token card is the smart
card. It is similar to the token card except it has an
embedded microprocessor. A smart card is not just a passive
container of data. It can actually perform computations,
such as computing the response function of a challenge
response system, or providing public key encryption
services. Since the smart card can be configured with a
local challenge and response system, the fact that it is
33
stolen by an intruder does not necessarily mean that he or
she can gain access. The proper response to the challenge
query must still be known. The smart card is a much more
secure means of access than the token card since access can
not be obtained if the card is lost or stolen. This avoids a
characteristic problem of token systems in which a user must
possess something to gain access that may be lost or stolen.
D. Physical Characteristics Access Control
The problem with using information such as passwords for
authentication is the information that grants access to the
network, the password, may become known to another person.
Items such as tokens, smart cards or other physical devices
that grant access may be stolen or duplicated.
Authentication mechanisms have been developed in recent
years that use the personal physical characteristics of
authorized users to grant access. These devices include
finger print and voice print analysis, as well as retinal
scans. A device for the verification of a person's identity
compares a measured set of electronic data, representing a
characteristic of someone claiming to be authorized to use
the system, with a set of stored data taken from the
authorized person. However, it is sometimes difficult, when
working with body measurements and other human processes,
such as speech or writing, to establish accurate reference
34
points and obtain repeatable registration for the
measurement and matching of patterns 31 .
1. Fingerprints
Matching fingerprints is a useful technique which can
be performed either at the local or host site, or by reading
the prints locally and making a comparison by means of a
computer at a remote site. The fingerprints are
electronically scanned either through a lighted prism or by
reading a sensitized card on which they have been placed32 .
In a self contained system, the image is compared with one
stored to produce a signal showing the degree of similarity
between the two prints. If the similarity is acceptable, the
person is cleared. Acceptance or rejection by most
identification devices may be signaled by a light or by a
readout on a video display terminal. A more complex
verification method requires transmission of fingerprint
signals to a remote computer, either the host itself, or a
computer at the network control center. This does away with
storing the file of prints locally, and so reduces the
chance of an intruder gaining access by tampering with the
local device 33 . One of the primary advantages of using
fingerprints and other authentication control mechanisms
that use physical characteristics is the medium to gain
access, in this case the fingerprints, cannot be lost or
stolen. Although the use of fingerprints is a more secure
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access control mechanism than passwords, it is possible for
a sophisticated intruder to duplicate fingerprints.
2. Voice Recognition Systems
One type of access control mechanism that can be used
is voice recognition systems. A computer can analyze
digitized voice signals accurately enough to distinguish one
voice from another, and to verify a speaker's identity. One
such computerized voice verification system is first trained
with a vocabulary of selected words. The person seeking
access to the system enters a claimed identity by keyboard
to retrieve a reference profile. The system then generates a
phrase from the vocabulary and presents this phrase to the
person over a loudspeaker using prerecorded or synthesized
speech34 . The person repeats the phrase into a microphone
which transmits the signals to digitizing circuits and then
to the computer. The computer then locates specific parts of
speech waveforms and matches them against the appropriate
reference profiles. If they match within a specified
tolerance, the person's identity is considered verified,
otherwise he or she is rejected. The reason for using
several words from a larger vocabulary is to prevent an
imposter from using a recording of an authorized person's
voice. Even if the imposter had a recording of the
vocabulary as spoken by an authorized user, it would be
quite difficult to pick out the designated words and play
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them into the microphone in the short time available. There
is considerable controversy regarding the possibility of
recognizing speakers over ordinary telephone circuits, due
to noise and loss of fidelity. The quality of these circuits
also varies considerably from one connection to another. It
is possible to digitize the voice at the source so that it
may be transmitted without distortion. This would require
special equipment for digitizing and buffering the spoken
phrases, and would probably increase transmission time
considerably, since high-fidelity speech has a higher
information content than that transmitted by telephone
lines 35 . It is for this reason that voice recognition systems
are not considered practical alternatives for access when
used in a networking environment.
3. Retinal Scanners
The most secure means of authentication is the use of
retinal scanners. Each person's eyes have a distinct pattern
of blood vessels that are unique to that person, much like
fingerprints. The information that maps the eye is digitized
and recorded. To gain access a person's eyes are scanned and
the information is compared with the recorded information.
The use of retinal scanners is extremely secure but also
very expensive to implement. It is usually used for
extremely sensitive access requirements. The use of retinal
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scanners to gain access to a network is very rare, much like
the use of fingerprints.
E. Multilevel Security
The techniques discussed so far, have been concerned
primarily with security as it relates to the individual
user. A somewhat different, but widely applicable
requirement, is to protect data or resources on the basis of
levels of security36 . This is commonly found in the military,
where information can be unclassified, confidential, secret,
top secret, or beyond. The concept of multilevel security is
applicable in other areas where information can be organized
into categories and users can be granted clearances to
access certain categories of data. For example, the highest
level of security might be for strategic planning documents
and data, accessible by only high level personnel and their
staff. Next might come sensitive financial and personnel
data, accessible only by administration personnel.
When multiple categories or levels of data are defined,
the requirement is referred to as one of multilevel
security. The requirement, which is based on current finite
state security models, is in two parts and can be simply
stated as follows: A multilevel secure system must enforce 37
no read up, that is a subject can only read an object of a
less or equal security level. It must also enforce no write
down, a subject can only write into an object of greater or
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equal security level. These two rules, if properly enforced,
provide multilevel security, however, the overhead required
to implement a multilevel security apparatus is significant,
and the restrictions they impose create additional problems
in a distributed environment.
F . Summary
The large number of people who have access to data
networks creates significant concern over the need to
accurately verify their identities. Intruders continue to
gain unauthorized access to networks and are causing
widespread damage to computing resources. This problem has
become especially acute since the incorporation of many
smaller subnets into the Internet do not provide adequate
security measures. The increased demand for security has
produced a variety of protective devices that verify the
identity of a person at the terminal before allowing that
individual access to the network. These authentication and
access control mechanisms include physical security
measures, as well as other techniques such as passwords,
token keys or identification cards. Personal characteristics
mechanisms such as handwriting, fingerprints, and voice
patterns are becoming more and more common in order to
neutralize potential attackers. Chapter IX provides
guidelines to help determine the appropriate types of




There are two basic approaches to considerations of
communications security. These are link-level and end-to-end
level security measures. The former independently protects
messages on each of the communications links, while the
latter provides continuous protection for each message from
its source to its destination. When evaluating these two
approaches one must look at the communication medium used at
various links in the network and their susceptibility to
attack. The use of trusted hosts and trusted networks ensure
the integrity of link-level and end-to-end systems.
1. Link-Oriented
Link-oriented protection provides security for
messages passing over an individual communications link
between two nodes independent of the ultimate source and
destination of the messages. The underlying assumption in
providing protection of this sort is that it is much easier
to attack the communications link, rather than the nodes
themselves. However, often it may not be possible or
economically feasible to physically secure nodes in a
network as readily as in the terminal and host nodes. Yet,
subversion of one of the packet switching nodes results in
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exposure of all the message traffic passing through that
node, despite the physical security precautions in effect at
the source and destination. If the only unsecured
communication link in a network occur within the
communication subnet, link-oriented measures have an
advantage, in that they can provide a transparent form of
communication security for the hosts attached to the
network. If only some of the communication links between
terminals and hosts need to be protected, security measures
for these links can be implemented without affecting the
other hosts on the network38 .
2. End-to-End Oriented
Rather than viewing a network as a collection of
nodes joined by communication links, each of which can be
independently protected, one can view a network as a medium
for transporting messages in secure fashion from source to
destination. From this perspective, end-to-end security
measures protect messages in transit between source and
destination nodes in such a way that the subversion of any
of the communication links between the source and
destination does not result in exposure of message traffic39 .
There is some flexibility in defining the points at which
end-to-end security measures are implemented: from host to
host, from terminal to terminal or service host, or from
terminal to process on a service host. By extending the
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domain of end-to-end security measures, more of the
communication path between a user and his application, or
between a pair of users, is protected. However, as the
domain of such measures is extended, the range of hardware
and software that must interface with these measures may
increase40 . Since end-to-end security measures usually extend
beyond the communication subnet, these measures sometimes
require a greater degree of standardization of interfaces
and protocols for subscribers to the network. However, such
standardization is already coming about for technical,
economic, and political reasons. A major advantage of end-
to-end security measures is individual users and hosts can
elect to employ them without affecting other users and
hosts, and thus the cost of employing such measures can be
more accurately apportioned. Moreover, these measures can be
employed not only in packet-switched networks, but also in
packet broadcast networks, where link-oriented measures are
often not applicable.
3. Connections Oriented
In many applications, a communication network is
viewed as providing its users with a medium for establishing
connections or virtual circuits from source to destination.
This view suggests that security services be connection-
oriented. Thus, connection-oriented security measures
constitute a refinement of end-to-end measures41 . As is the
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case with end-to-end security measures, there is
considerable flexibility in choosing the points that are to
act as the ends of the connection for security purposes.
Connection-oriented security measures not only protect that
portion of a communication path that lies between the
security-defined ends of the connection, but also
significantly reduce the probability of undetected cross-
talk, whether induced by hardware or software, over that
interval42 . In the case of a full-duplex connection between a
terminal and a process on a service host, the connection is
composed of two independent simplex channels. In many
applications, the connection exists for the duration of a
single log-in session. Both the terminals and the host are
assumed to reside in secure areas while the remainder of the
network may be subject to exploitation. A terminal may, at
different times, be used by various individuals over a range
of authorization levels. The host provides services to a
diverse user community, not all of whose members employ
communications security measures. An intruder, represented
by a computer under hostile control, is assumed to be
situated in the communications path between the host and the
terminal. Thus all messages transmitted on the connection
must pass through the intruder. In many respects,
connection-oriented measures provide the greatest degree of
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communications security and they are applicable in a wide
variety of environments.
Although both link-oriented and connection-oriented
security measures have advantages and disadvantages peculiar
to themselves, connection-oriented security measures
generally afford greater overall protection in a wide range
of environments and are more naturally suited to a user's
perceptions of his or her own security reguirements. This
stems from the fact that connection-oriented measures rely
on the security of eguipment only at the source and
destination of a connection, while link-oriented measures
may reguire that each node in the communication subnet be
secure. However, there are situations where both types of
measures can be useful and can be employed to provide an
economic level of protection that is higher than which could
be achieved using either class of measure alone.
Bo Attack Classifications
We can classify types of attacks that might be mounted by
an intruder. If an intruder can position himself at some
point in the network through which information must pass he
or she will be able to conduct both active and passive
attacks. For example, in an internetwork environment, the
intruder could take the form of a gateway in some
intermediate network that provides the only communication
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path between two processes that are at the ends of the
connection of interest.
1. Passive Attacks
In passive wiretapping, the intruder merely observes
messages passing on a connection without interfering with
their flow. Intruder observation of the data in a message
can be termed "release of message contents", and is the most
fundamental type of passive wiretapping43 . The intruder can
also observe portions of the message headers, even if the
application-level data are not intelligible to him, to learn
the location and identities of the communicating processes.
Finally, the intruder can examine the lengths of messages
and their frequency of transmission to gain knowledge of the
nature of the data being exchanged. These latter types of
passive wiretapping attacks are usually referred to as
"traffic analysis" or "violations of transmission
security" 44 . Although traffic analysis is usually viewed as a
means of inferring information by observing legitimate
message traffic, this form of attack can also be used in
conjunction with a Trojan Horse program operating in a user
process at a service host. The Trojan Horse program could
perform some legitimate function within the process while
clandestinely modulating message destination, length, or
frequency of transmission in order to use the connection as
a covert channel for transmitting to the intruder, data
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legitimately accessible by the process. In an interactive
communication environment, if the bandwidth of the
communication network is high relative to the speed of user
terminal equipment, modulation of message length and
frequency could by carried out by a Trojan Horse program and
still be completely undetected by a user45 .
2 . Active Attacks
The intruder can also engage in "active wiretapping",
performing a variety of processing on messages passing on
the connection. These messages can be selectively modified,
deleted, delayed, reordered, duplicated, and inserted into
the connection at a later point in time, or may pass through
unaffected. He can also synthesize bogus messages and insert
them into the connection. Acts such as these can be
designated "message stream modification attacks" 46 . Since it
is assumed that the intruder can be positioned so that all
messages of interest flow through his location, the intruder
can discard all messages or, in a less drastic action, can
delay all messages going in either or both directions on a
connection. Acts of this nature can be classified as "denial
of message service attacks" 47 . Depending on the communication
medium employed, measures can be used that make it extremely
difficult for an intruder to severely disrupt
communications. Such tamper free techniques are of interest
in any environment where disruption of communications is a
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problem. In the context of message deletion or delay, the
difference between message stream modification and denial of
message service attacks is subtle, and is a function both of
the degree of the attack and the state of the connection.
The distinction is made because different types of
countermeasures can be employed for each type of attack.
Finally, connections must be initiated in a fashion that
supports secure identification of the hosts, terminals, and
users at each end, and verifies the time integrity of the
connection. Attempts by an intruder to violate time-
integrity or secure identification constraints can be
classified as "spurious connection initiation" attacks48 .
Such attacks are similar in nature to message stream
modification attacks, but the context of connection




A computer system which has been approved as meeting a
specified level of security protection, together with any
other parts of the system which are known to be secure, is
termed a trusted computer base or TCB. Computers and
operating systems which may be considered to be a TCB,
together with their applications software, must meet the
appropriate security criteria specified in the Orange book,
"Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria" (TSEC)
,
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published by the National Computer Security Council (NCSC)
.
The Orange book specifies three levels of protection, A,B
and C (in decreasing order of protection) and within each
division numbers are given to classify the categories of
security protection and assurance. For example, the highest
level of protection and assurance achieved is Al, A
indicating verified protection and Al indicating a verified
design, while A2 indicates verified implementation which is
beyond the present state-of-the-art. Systems in class Al are
functionally equivalent to those in class B3 but formal
design specification and verification techniques are
applied. Class B3 systems possess security domains which
mediate all accesses of subjects and objects, are
tamperproof, and exclude code which is not essential to the
security capability. Class B2 (structured protection)
systems are based on a clearly defined and documented formal
security policy model. It enforces discretionary and
mandatory access control enforcement, as found in class Bl,
but is extended to cover all subjects and objects in the
system, including strengthened authentication mechanisms.
Class Bl (labelled security protection) systems have all the
features of class C2 systems, but include an informal
statement on the security policy modes, data labelling and
mandatory access control over named subjects and objects49 .
The selection of the appropriate level of security for a
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system depends upon the local processing capability,
communication path, data exposure, as well as the capability
of the user.
The use of a trusted computer base is extremely expensive
and costs many times more to achieve an Al system than a CI
system. The Orange book provides a range of security
protection from low assurance and low functionality up to
high assurance and high functionality, but the need for
systems with, for example, low functionality and high
assurance or high functionality and low assurance, are not
considered.
D. Trusted Networks
Wide area networks are a potentially insecure means of
communication and a range of countermeasures are available
to combat the threat. Local area networks (LANS) are,
however, often considered to be less vulnerable because they
are generally located on territory owned or under the
control of the user. LANS do, however, possess many of the
vulnerabilities found in wide area networks, as well as
those vulnerabilities associated with a stand alone-computer
system. In particular, most LANs use a broadcast mode of
transmission which makes all data available to all devices
connected to the LAN50 . Additionally, the same communication
medium may be used for different applications with different
security requirements. Another significant problem is that
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LANs are frequently connected by gateways to wide area
networks, thus making the data remotely accessible.
A trusted network is an extension of the trusted computer
base where the transmission of information on the network is
considered secure, and each access point includes a trusted
network interface unit (TNIU) which prevents users from
gaining access to information which they are not authorized
to receive51 . A trusted network provides a service to the
trusted computer base by guaranteeing authentication, mutual
secrecy, and message delivery. The TNIU must contain only
trusted computing facilities and software, and may use
encryption to provide protection for data transmitted on the
network, but physical security measures may alternatively be
used to protect data on the network, possibly at a lower
cost.
An alternative approach to network security is to employ
a Secure Terminal Interface Unit (STIU) between the user and
the LAN interface unit. A Secure Host Interface Unit (SHIU)
is also required between the trusted host and the LAN. Both
of these units include equipment which encrypts only the
data, not the network control information. Communication
between the host computer and the user is achieved by the
user establishing a connection with encrypted address codes,
and then the host computer authenticating the identity of
the user through password validation and checking on the
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user's access rights 52 . This approach is more complex than a
trusted network with TNIUs, but it may be implemented with
any LAN
.
A trusted network prevents any communication which is not
authorized by the network. This is achieved by using a
Secure Authentication Server (SAS) as part of the network.
The SAS gives each TNIU permission tokens for each session
appropriate to the user's rights and needs. The SAS will
also maintain a security file which stores passwords. A user
on a trusted network initiates authentication directly with
the TNIU, and the TNIU communicates with the SAS to get the
authentication for the user confirmed. When this is
confirmed by the SAS, the TNIU instructs the user to
proceed. The user then has to be authenticated to the host
computer using a password and a unique identifier from the
TNIU. The SAS checks that the two identifiers match and that
the user is authorized to access the host computer. When the
check is complete, the SAS informs the TNIU that the user
can proceed. The user must then enter the names of the
devices with which communication is desired in the session,
and the SAS checks the user's authority to communicate as
requested. If the user is authorized, the SAS will arrange
for the connections and inform the TNIU to permit these
other connections during the session53 .
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E. Summary
When evaluating networks there are two ways to consider
communications security. Link-level connections protect
messages on each of the communication links. End-to-end
level security measures provides continuous protection for
each message from its source to its destination. What makes
networking systems more vulnerable than stand-alone systems,
is the ability to exploit the communication medium that
interfaces different networking resources. The exploitation
of these weaknesses can be either passive or active,
depending on the capabilities or opportunities of the
intruder. The use of trusted hosts and trusted networks





Of all the topics concerning networking security perhaps
the most complicated is the process of encryption. There are
hundreds of algorithms used for encryption and the complex
topic of encryption by itself is beyond the scope of this
thesis. Only a brief description is presented here.
Encryption is the process of changing a message called
plaintext to ciphertext, and is based on the concept of a
cipher. A cipher is an algorithmic transformation performed
on a symbol-by-symbol basis on any data. For the purposes of
electronic data transmission, such as that used in
networking communications, a cipher is a one to one
representation of a message. The original plaintext may be
used directly in the computation, or it may be viewed as a
binary stream superimposed upon an enciphering stream.
B. Ciphers
There are four basic types of ciphers 54 . A substitution or
stream cipher substitutes a letter or number for each
character being enciphered. A transposition or permutation
cipher (often called a block cipher) , uses letters or
numbers of text and scrambles them in some predetermined
pattern. A combination cipher uses substitution and
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transposition intermixed to convert the message to
ciphertext.
Product cipher encryption combines the operations of
permutation and substitution. When formed correctly every
bit of the cipher will depend on every bit of the plaintext
and every bit of the key. A product cipher may be
constructed by using the permutation and substitution
operations in an iterative manner. If the result of this
pair of operations is reentered into the same process, the
cipher that is produced is called a recirculating block
product cipher. A complex algorithm that is easy to
implement may be based on a recirculating block product
cipher.
1. Block and Stream Ciphers
Another form of classification for cipher techniques
are the terms "block ciphers" and "stream ciphers". Block
ciphers transform a block of characters together, making
each encrypted output block a functional combination of the
complete key and the input block. In this type of
encryption the blocks of plaintext bits are transformed into
blocks of cipher bits simultaneously. In general the blocks
are the same size. If the cipher block is smaller than the
plaintext block then information is lost unless an
appropriate data compression method is used in conjunction
with the encryption algorithm55 . If the cipher block is
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bigger, utilization of the data transmission path is
reduced. A stream cipher makes each bit of encrypted data a
function of only one bit of the original plaintext and one
bit of the key. A stream cipher causes only the plaintext
bits, which correspond to bits of ciphertext that are
corrupted in transmission, to be lost. With a block cipher,
the entire plaintext block is lost if any part of the
ciphertext block becomes corrupted. Both forms of cipher
lose the rest of the message or text block if a whole
character is lost or added, causing the synchronization
between the key streams at the transmitter and receiver to
be lost.
2 . Private Key Ciphers
Conventional private key ciphers use the same key to
decipher the message as well as to encipher it. Anyone in
possession of the key and a decryption unit which implements
the correct algorithm can decipher the message. Private key
systems provide a two-way channel to their users. If two
users A and B share a secret key, they can both encrypt
information that they are sending to each other as well as
decrypt information sent from the other. The best example of
a private key system is the Data Encryption Standard or DES
algorithm. DES was developed by the US National Bureau of
Standards in conjunction with IBM and is used by the general
public. It is the only encryption standard which is widely
55
used in industry. The cryptographic strength of the DES
algorithm is the number of possible combinations that must
be utilized to break the cipher. If you had a 56-bit key the
number of possible combinations of bits which could produce
a key is 2 56 or 7.2 * 10 16 . With an example of ciphertext and
the corresponding plaintext available, a computer would be
required to try up to 2 56 different keys by trial an error to
discover the true key56 . The time and expense required to
break a DES key is considered to exceed the value of any
information transmitted, however, advances in computer
technology have made this assumption questionable.
There are several disadvantages with private key
systems. If the key is compromised the intruders can
immediately decrypt all encrypted information and can also
produce bogus messages. For this reason, cipher keys are
changed frequently so that a compromised key will reveal
only a limited amount of information57 . This poses an
additional problem since the keys in many cases must be
distributed by hand or by courier. This makes them
vulnerable to exploitation. One approach to this problem is
to distribute the keys in pieces under separate channels, so
that any compromise of a part of the key will not compromise
the entire key. An associated problem is the number of keys
that must be maintained, since the number of keys required
increases with the square of the number of users. This
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compounds the problem of key distribution and makes adding
new users to the system impractical in many situations. The
magnitude of this problem is usually contained by having
only a few people exchange secrets so that the network of
interchanges is relatively small.
3. Public Key Ciphers
A public key cipher uses different keys to encipher
and decipher the message. Pairs of keys are used, and these
define a pair of transformation algorithms, each the inverse
of the other, and one may not be derived from the other58 .
All users possess a pair of keys, one of which is publicly
known and is used to encipher messages for that user, while
the second key is kept secret for use in deciphering
messages sent to the user. If user A wishes to send a
message to user B, the message is encrypted using the public
key of user B, and the private key of user A. Since it is
impossible for anyone else to reproduce this combination of
keys, except users A and B, the message is unforgeable and
cannot be altered. User B can decrypt the message using the
public key of user A, and the private key of user B. This
insures that the message is authentic and provides a digital
signature, since only user A could have sent the message.
Public key cryptosystems are based on one-way
functions which are computationally infeasible in the
reverse direction. If a solution to the reverse computation
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were found, the cryptosystem would be compromised. The major
advantage of public key cryptosystems is that only public
keys are distributed to potential information sources;
whereas, conventional ciphers require the highly sensitive
keys to be distributed, therefore increasing the risk of
being compromised as well as requiring frequent key
changes 59 . The disadvantage of public key cryptosystems is
that they are slow and that the integrity of the public key
directory must be maintained.
The best example of a public key system is the RSA
public key encryption scheme developed at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman, from
whose names the title was derived. It is the most widely
used public key cryptosystem suitable for applications in
electronic mail, where a signature may be verified by
consulting a directory of public keys, and in data
communications for privacy and authentication60 . The RSA
algorithm is based on the underlying hard problem of
factoring large numbers. The high processing requirement for
public key cryptosystems has restricted their commercial use
to a few banking applications; however, they are extensively
used by the government. RSA uses large data blocks,
typically 512 bits, and encryption requires the equivalent
of three million sixteen-bit multiplications per block.
Software implementations require about 45 seconds to process
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a 512-bit block on an IBM PC while hardware implementations
take at least 0.1 seconds 61 . With these long processing
times, RSA is not attractive for many high-speed data
communication reguirements. The RSA keys are 2 00-bit words.
The encryption key is the product of two secret prime
numbers, each about 100 bits, and the decryption key may
also be computed from the two prime numbers. To derive the
secret prime numbers, the key may be factored, but this
would take 3.8 billion years for a 200-bit key, assuming one
operation per microsecond62 . A plaintext message is first
converted into a data block up to 512 bits in length.
Encryption of a plain text block, using the encryption key,
produces a cipher text block of the same size. Decryption is
the reverse of the encryption process but using the
decryption key.
C. Encryption Techniques
Encryption is primarily a countermeasure against passive
attacks to prevent the disclosure of data, but can also be
used as the basis of countermeasures against active attacks
in order to prevent the modification of data. Encryption may
be implemented on each data transmission link without regard
for message content, or as end-to-end encryption, applied at
the user level before data enters the network and decrypted
at the destination. End-to-end encryption makes it necessary
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to put information such as headers, which are required by
the network, in plaintext.
1. Link Encryption
Link encryption can be performed independently on
each of the different communication links in a network.
Usually, a different key is employed for each link so that
subversion of one link does not necessarily result in
release of information transmitted on other links. Stream
ciphers are generally employed in link encryption, and a
continuous stream of ciphertext bits is maintained between
nodes. Because switching functions are performed only at
nodes in a network, both the headers and the data of packets
used can be enciphered on links. Since many of the links in
the network are multiplexed, no segregation of connections
on links is enforced. Since information is enciphered only
on the links and not within the nodes connected by links,
these nodes must be secure. Although the origin and
destination nodes in the network are assumed to be
physically secure, link encryption requires the extension of
this physical security to all intermediate nodes as well.
Not only must these intermediate nodes be physically secure,
but also the hardware and software components of these nodes
must be certified to isolate the information on each of the
connections passing through it63 .
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2 . End-to-End Encryption
In end-to-end encryption each message is enciphered
at its source and not deciphered until it reaches its
destination. A unique key can be used for each connection or
a different key can be used between each pair of
communicating hosts, or a single key can be used over an
entire secure subnet. These schemes afford end-to-end
protection but do not provide the connection segregation of
link encryption. In accordance with the principle of least
privilege or need to know, messages should be enciphered so
that each module that processes a message, has available to
it, only the information necessary in performing its task.
The information in a message can be categorized based on
whether the information must be accessible to gateways,
hosts, or processes at the end of the connection. Gateways
must access header fields, indicating the destination
network, as well as any fields associated with internet
services 64 . The gateway into the destination network must
also be able to access the address of the destination host.
The information in the message can be enciphered under a key
used only for that connection. The encryption can be
achieved either by selective encipherment of appropriate
information fields or by embedding the information from each
level in a protocol layer for the next level and performing
encryption on the layered message at each level 65 . In
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practice variations on these techniques are employed, using
some aspects of selective encryption and protocol layering.
D. Summary
Encryption in computers and networks is an extensive and
complex topic. Understanding the basics of encryption allows
for the utilization of varying techniques to help maintain a
secure communications network. Encryption is the process of
changing a message called plaintext to ciphertext and is
based on the concept of a cipher. Conventional private key
ciphers use the same key to decipher the message as used to
encipher it. A public key cipher uses different keys to
encipher and decipher the message. Link encryption encrypts
data at each individual link in the transmission path of the
message. End-to-end encryption enciphers each message at its
source and deciphers it at its destination.
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VIII. DETECTION AND PREVENTION
A. Introduction
In order for any network security policy to be effective
there must be a way to detect potential intruders, and a
means of preventing their access to the resources of the
network. A capability must exist to monitor security
compliance and respond to incidents involving violations of
security. An ongoing monitoring and enforcement program
assures continued effectiveness of information protection
measures. Early monitoring and detection of potential
abusers greatly facilitate the ability to maintain a safe
and secure network.
B. Prevention and Detection
We can establish five goals for the design of mechanisms
that provide for communications security in a network: 66
1. Prevention of release of message contents.
2. Prevention of traffic analysis.
3. Detection of message stream modification.
4. Detection of denial of message service.
5. Detection of spurious connection initiation.
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1. Prevention of Release of Message Contents
The primary means of preventing the release of
message contents is by the use of encryption. Both link and
end-to-end encryption techniques can be employed.
2. Prevention of Traffic Analysis
Traffic analysis countermeasures center around
masking the frequency, length, and origin-destination
patterns of message traffic. The precision with which an
intruder can carry out such pattern analysis directly
influences the amount of information that can be gained from
the analysis. This precision is a function of several
factors, including the protocols employed in the network,
transmission medium of the communication subnet, and
operating characteristics of the hosts 67 . For example,
analysis can take place at several levels in the network
environment, enabling an intruder to determine the origin
and destination of the messages. The difficulty associated
with countering attacks at each level depends heavily on the
specific protocol being used and on the network environment.
3. Detection of Message Stream Modification
To achieve the third goal, detection of message
stream modification, mechanisms must be employed to
determine message authenticity, integrity, and ordering.
Authenticity implies that the source of a message can be
reliably determined. Integrity implies that a message has
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not been modified enroute, and ordering implies that a
message can be properly located in the stream of information
being transmitted from the source to the destination.
Although these functions are usually provided by a
communication protocol for reliability purposes, they must
be provided in the face of attacks by an intruder, as
opposed to failures by components. Message authenticity and
ordering requirements, combined with a secure connection,
require the use of distinct encryption keys for each
connection. More important, the protocol data that provide
the basis for authentication and ordering must be bound to
application data in a fashion that precludes undetected
modification of any portion of the resulting message68 .
4. Detection of Denial of Message Service
The fourth protection goal, detection of denial of
message service, can be achieved through the use of a
request-response protocol 69 . Such a protocol, built on top of
message authentication and ordering, involves the exchange
of a pair of messages that establish the time integrity and
status of the connection. At each end of the connection a
timer is used to periodically trigger the transmission of a
request message that forces a response from the other end of
the connection. Each of these messages conveys the status of
its transmitter in terms that permit detection of any
messages missing from the connection. An explicit request-
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response protocol can be provided by defining a pair of end-
to-end control messages containing both a sequence number
and an acknowledgement field along with an error-detection
code70 . Many applications provide implicit checking for
denial of message service attacks because of the command
response nature of the application. General purpose
protocols for interactive and other types of applications
cannot rely on such application dependent characteristics.
5. Detection of Spurious Connection Initiation
Countermeasures for accomplishing the fifth goal,
detection of spurious connection initiation, are designed to
provide a secure basis for verifying the identities of the
users at each end of the connection, and verifying the time
integrity of the connection. Verification of the time
integrity of the connection protects against "playback"
attacks in which an intruder uses a recording of a previous
legitimate connection to mislead or confuse a user, or cause
a service host process to perform redundant activities,
possibly resulting in errors. Mechanisms for verifying the
time integrity of the connection initiation procedure should
not require human intervention, so as not to restrict their
applicability, and to avoid dependence on and inconvenience
to users. Verification of identities of users at ends of the
connection during the connection initiation procedure
provides the basis on which the authenticity of subsequent
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message traffic is founded. Maintenance of this association
between the users identified during connection initiation
involves appropriate key distribution techniques and other
measures71 .
C. Audit Trails
One of the most effective means of detecting and
preventing unauthorized access to networking resources is to
establish effective audit mechanisms72 . Audit trails are used
to detect and deter penetration of a computer or network
system and may be limited to specific events, or may
encompass all of the activities on a system. The audit
mechanism has four important security goals73 . First, the
mechanism must allow access to individual objects to be
reviewed and access histories of specific processes and
individuals. Second, the mechanism must allow discovery of
repeated attempts to bypass the protection mechanisms.
Third, the mechanism must allow discovery of any use of
privileges that may occur when a user assumes a
functionality with privileges greater than his or her own.
Fourth, the mechanism must act as a deterrent against
perpetrators habitual attempts to bypass the system
protection mechanisms, even if the attempt to bypass the
protection mechanism is successful74 . The techniques for
implementing the audit requirements will vary from system to
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system depending upon the characteristics of the software
and hardware involved.
D. Summary
An effective prevention and detection mechanism is
important in implementing a network security program. The
incorporation of audit trail mechanisms is just one aspect
of an effective monitoring program. A positive benefit of a
monitoring and enforcement process is an increased
understanding of the degree of information related risk in
network operations. Only in this way can potential intruders
be denied access to a network, or if penetration is
realized, to detect the intruders and identify the weak
links in the network computer system.
68
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Conclusions
Network security is a diverse and dynamic subject that
encompasses not only conventional computer security issues
but the added difficulties associated with networks. As
such, the problem of maintaining security in networks is a
much more difficult one. Every host and network manager must
be aware that the DDN as presently constituted is not
secure. Recent events have made all concerned with the DDN
much more sensitive to the issue of security.
Access control measures, physical security, procedural
and personnel security controls, are some of the more
apparent problems that can be addressed in maintaining
security. The medium used to interconnect computer
communications systems represents an additional security
dimension that significantly increases the vulnerability of
computing resources. The use of encryption in networks, both
end-to-end and link-level, is fundamental in addressing
network communications security. The problems of network
security are applicable not only to the DDN and its large
infrastructure, but to any networking or Internet
environment where there is a concern against unauthorized
access. The success of a network protection program depends
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on the policy generated, and on the attitude of management
toward security and security related issues. The
administrator sets the tone and the emphasis on how
important a role network security will have within the
organization. The primary responsibility of management is to
set the network security policy with the objectives of
reduced risk, compliance with laws and regulations,
assurance of operational continuity, information integrity,
and confidentiality. This can most easily be accomplished
with a comprehensive security plan. This chapter proposes a
set of recommendations that will help network administrators
identify potential problems and to take steps to alleviate
them.
B. Recommendations
There are several things network managers can due to
ensure that security and integrity are maintained in a
network. One must take in to consideration that the
implementation of any comprehensive security plan is not
without costs or trade-offs. The value of the information to
be protected, and the degree to which systems administrators
are willing to define and implement policy, are a major
factor in security of networks. By following the
recommendations presented in this thesis, the network
administrator can identify and evaluate the potential
vulnerabilities of a network, and implement an effective
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security policy. The bottom line to remember is that the
network as a whole is only as secure as its weakest link.
Adequate security controls must be in place to protect the
network.
1. Security Plan
A security plan will require the staff, funding and
positive incentives to personnel to participate in a program
to protect the organizations assets. The administrator
should state precisely75 , the value to the organization of
data and information resources, and the need to preserve
their integrity, availability, and confidentiality. The
intent of the organization to protect the resources from
accidental or deliberate unauthorized disclosure,
modification, or destruction, must be identified. There must
be responsibility for data security throughout the
organization and personnel should be held personally
accountable for information resources entrusted to them.
Computer security and awareness training should be
administered to all personnel having access to information
resources. Finally, there needs to be a requirement to
monitor and assess data security via internal and external
audit procedures.
2 . Reduce Risk to an Acceptable Level
The dollars spent for security measures to control or
contain losses should never be more than the projected
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dollar loss if something adverse happened to the information
resource. Cost effective security results when reduction in
risk is balanced with the cost of implementing safeguards.
The greater the value of information processed, or the more
severe the consequences if something happens to it, the
greater the need for control measures to protect it. It is
important that these trade-offs of cost versus risk be
explicitly considered, and that management understands the
degree of risk remaining after selected controls are
implemented.
3. Assure Operational Continuity
With ever increasing demands for timely information
and greater volumes of information being processed,
availability of essential systems, networks, and data is a
major protection issue. In some cases, service disruptions
of just a few hours are unacceptable. Agency reliance on
essential computer systems requires that advance planning be
done to allow timely restoration of processing capabilities
in the event of severe service disruption76 . The impact due
to an inability to process data should be assessed, and
action taken to assure availability of those systems
considered essential to agency operation.
4 . Comply with Federal Laws and Regulations
As the pervasiveness of computer systems increases
and the risks and vulnerabilities associated with
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information systems become better understood, the body of
law and regulations governing positive action to protect
information resources grows. The "Rainbow" series of
documents published in accordance with DOD directive 5215.1,
"Computer Security Evaluation Center", provide a baseline
for an information resources security program.
5. Assure Integrity and Confidentiality
An important objective of a network resource
management program is to ensure that the information
accessed via the network is accurate. Integrity of
information means you can trust the data and the processes
that manipulate it. A system has integrity when it provides
sufficient accuracy and completeness to meet the needs of
the users. It should be properly designed to automate all
functional requirements, include appropriate accounting and
integrity controls, and accommodate the full range of
potential conditions that might be encountered in its
operation77 . A network should also be protected from
intruders, as well as from personnel with authorized
computer access privileges who attempt to perform
unauthorized actions. Assured confidentiality of sensitive
data is often, but not always, a requirement of network
computer systems. Privacy requirements for personal
information are generally dictated by directive while
protection requirements for other agency information are a
73
function of the nature of that information. Determination of
requirements in the latter case is made by the official
responsible for that information. The impact of wrongful
disclosure should be considered in understanding
confidentiality requirements.
6. Accountability for Information
An effective information resource protection program
identifies the information used by the agency and assigns
primary responsibility for information protection to the
managers of the respective functional areas supported by the
data. These managers know the importance of the data to the
organization and are able to quantify the consequences of
undesirable events. They are also able to detect
deficiencies in data and know definitively who must have
access to the data supporting their operations. A
fundamental networking security issue is assignment of
accountability. Information flows throughout the
organization and can be shared by many individuals. This
tends to blur accountability and disperse decision making
regarding information protection. Accountability should be
explicitly assigned for determining and monitoring security
for appropriate agency information. When security violations
occur, management must be accountable for responding and
investigating. Security violations should trigger a
reevaluation of access authorizations, protection decisions,
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and control techniques. All apparent violations should be
resolved since absolute protection will never be achieved
and some losses are inevitable. It is important, however,
that the degree of risk assumed be commensurate with the
sensitivity or importance of the information resource to be
protected.
7. Vulnerability Assessment
A risk assessment program ensures management that
periodic reviews of information resources have considered
the degree of vulnerability to threats causing destruction,
modification, disclosure, and delay of information
availability, in making protection decisions and investments
in safeguards. The official responsible for a specific
information resource determines protection requirements.
Less sensitive information will require minimal safeguards,
while highly sensitive or critical information will require
strict protective measures. Assessment of vulnerability is
essential in specifying cost-effective safeguards.
Overprotection can be needlessly costly and add unacceptable
operational overhead. Once cost-effective safeguards are
selected, residual risk remains and is accepted by
management. Risk status should be periodically reexamined to
identify new threats, vulnerabilities, or other changes that
affect the degree of risk that management has previously
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accepted. Appendixes B through E provide checklists for a
vulnerability assessment.
8. Data Access
Access to information should be delegated according
to the principles of need-to-know and least possible
privilege. For a multi-user application system, only
individuals with authorized need to view or use data are
granted access authority, and they are allowed only the
minimum privileges needed to carry out their duties. For
personal computers with one operator, data should be
protected from unauthorized viewing or use. In networking
environments the principles of need-to-know are much more
difficult to implement. It is ultimately the administrators
and the individual's responsibility to ensure that the data
is secure and to know the vulnerabilities of data to
possible exploitation.
9. Degree of Centralization
The desirability of centralized versus decentralized
security is heavily debated and largely depends on size,
organizational structure, and management approach at an
individual agency78 . A centralized approach to security has
the advantages of being directly responsive to executive
direction and specifically accountable for progress and
status. A decentralized approach to security has the
advantages of being close to the local network
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administrator. In the long term, decentralization may
provide better integration of security with other entity
functions. A small dedicated resource at the local level can
direct the information protection program, while additional
resources are utilized to maintain the integrity of the
network as a whole.
10. Implementation Stages
Development of a comprehensive information protection
program that is practiced and observed widely throughout a
network usually occurs in stages and requires ongoing
monitoring and maintenance to remain viable. First,
organizational requirements for information protection are
identified. Different agencies have varying levels of need
for security, and the information protection program should
be structured to most effectively meet those needs. Next,
organizational policies are developed that provides a
security architecture for agency operations. The policies
undergo normal review procedures, then are approved by
agency management for implementation. Activities are then
initiated to bring the agency into compliance with the
policies. Depending on the degree of centralization, this
might require development of further plans and budgets
within the agency to implement the necessary logical and
physical controls.
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11. Hardware and Software Configuration Controls
Protection of hardware and resources of computer
systems and networks greatly contributes to the overall
level of control and protection of information in the DDN.
Network protection policies should provide substantial
direction concerning the management and control of computer
hardware and software. Agency information should be
protected from the potentially destructive impact of
unauthorized hardware and software. For example, software
viruses inserted into computers through games and other
apparently useful software, acquired via public access
bulletin boards, have spread from system to system before
being detected. Also, unauthorized hardware additions to
personal computers can introduce unknown dial-in access
paths. Accurate records of hardware and software inventory,
configurations, and locations should be maintained, and
control mechanisms should provide assurance that
unauthorized changes have not occurred. To avoid legal
liability, no unauthorized copying of software should be
permitted. Agencies should also address the issue of
personal use of federal computer systems, giving personnel




Agency standards should clearly communicate minimum
expected controls to be present in all computer facilities,
computer operations, input/output handling, network
management, technical support, and user liaison. More
stringent controls would apply to those areas that process








The common practice of assigning responsibility for
information security to existing staff with other major
responsibilities is often unsuccessful. At least one
dedicated staff member is recommended at the program
management level. The need for additional full-time
resources depends on the organizations computer environment
The number of information systems, their technical
complexity, the degree of networking, the importance of
information processed, and extent of the organization's




Training should be a major activity in any network
security environment. Security violations are the result of
human action, and problems can usually be identified in
their earliest stages by people. Developing and maintaining
personnel awareness of information security issues can yield
large benefits in early detection and prevention of
problems. Target audiences for this training are executives
and policy makers, program and functional managers, security
and audit personnel, computer management and operations, and
end users. Training can be delivered through existing policy
and procedures manuals, written materials, presentations and
classes, and audio-visual training programs. The training
provided should create an awareness of risk and the
importance of safeguards, underscoring the specific
responsibilities of each of the individuals being trained.
C. Summary
Successful utilization of the DDN requires establishing
agency policies and practices regarding information
protection. The security policy directive facilitates
consistent protection of information resources. Supporting
procedures are most effectively implemented with top
management support, through a program focused on areas of
highest risk. A compliance assessment process ensures
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ongoing effectiveness of the information protection program
throughout the network.
Security is subjective, what one site might view as an
idle curiosity another would see as a hostile probe. The
existence of the DDN depends on its usefulness to all those
who use it. Network managers must be willing to accept and
act on other sites' security issues. The issue of security
in the DDN is a cooperative adventure requiring the
participation of all.
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APPENDIX A - PASSWORD SELECTION GUIDELINES
1. Do not use your login name in any form as a password.
2. Do not use your first or last name in any form.
3. Do not use your spouse or child's name in any form.
4. Do not use any information easily obtained about you.
This includes license plate numbers, social security
numbers, telephone numbers and other information.
5. Do not use a password of all digits, or all the same
letter. This significantly reduces the search time for an
intruder.
6. Do not use a word contained in dictionaries, spelling
lists, or other lists of words.
7. Do not use a password shorter than six characters.
8. Do use a password with mixed case alphabetic.
9. Do use a password with nonalphabetic characters, such as
digits or punctuation.
10. Do use a password that is easy to remember so you do not
have to write it down.
11. Do not use the same password for more than one year,
(six months is probably optimal)
.
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APPENDIX B - RISK ANALYSIS (PERSONNEL)
1. Are formal reports required for each reported instance of
computer penetration?
2. Are records maintained on the most common methods of
computer penetration?
3. Are records maintained on damage caused to computer
equipment and facilities?
4. Is one individual held accountable for each data
processing resource?
5. Does management understand threats posed by host
connection to the DDN?




Are the activities of any non-employees in the computer
center monitored? Is an escort policy enforced?
8. Are contractor personnel subject to the same security
procedures as other non-employees?
9. Are procedures installed to restrict personnel without a
"need to know"?
10. Have procedures been established to limit the damage,
corruption, or destruction of data base information?
11. Has a security incident report form been created?
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APPENDIX C - RISK ANALYSIS (OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT)
1. Has a systems security officer been appointed?
2. Have procedures been developed defining who can access
the computer facility, and how and when that access can
occur?
3. Have procedures been established to provide physical
protection of local and remote terminal access equipment?
4. Have procedures been established to provide physical
protection of host computers?
5. Is someone designated as a terminal area security
officer?
6. Have procedures been established to positively identify
transactions occurring to and from remote locations?
7. Have security procedures been established for the
microcomputers which will communicate with the DDN?
8. Have procedures been established for providing physical
security over these microcomputers and the data processed
by them?
9. Have procedures been established to protect data within
the custody of the microcomputer user?
10. Have alternate means of processing been established in
the event either the individual or the personal computer
is lost?
11. Is the security over the microcomputer environment
regularly reviewed?
12. Have the vendor installed passwords been changed?
13. Does someone verify that all current passwords are
different from a list of commonly used or vendor
installed passwords?
14. Has a backup policy been defined? Is this policy
strictly enforced?
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APPENDIX D - RISK ANALYSIS (COMMUNICATIONS)




Can data being transmitted or processed be reconstructed
in the event either main processing or remote processing
loses integrity?
3. Are processing actions restricted based on the point of
origin or the individual making the request?
4. Have procedures been established for providing host
connection access control over remote terminals and on-
site terminals?
5. Is a log maintained of accesses to computer resources?
6. Do non-employees have access to communications
facilities?
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APPENDIX E - RISK ANALYSIS (DISASTERS)
1. Have the types of potential disasters been identified?
2. Has equipment been provided to deal with minor disasters,
such as fire and water damage?
3. Have alternate processing arrangements been made in the
event of a disaster?
4. Have procedures been established to provide backup of
automatic data processing capabilities in event of loss
of primary ADP resources?
5. Have simulated disasters been conducted to ensure that
disaster procedures work?
6. Are critical programs and data retained in off-site
storage locations?
7. Have users been heavily involved in developing disaster
plans for applications that affect their areas?
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